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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case involves an employment case by which Mr. Frogley claims his employer retaliated 
against him for complaining of sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
and the Idaho Human Rights Act. 
Statement of Facts 
Plaintiff, \Vade Frogley, was hired by the Meridian School District to work as the Assistant 
Principal of Mountain View High School (MVHS) on July 31, 2008. (Aff. Frogley ~1- 2 at R. p. 
307). Prior to working for the Meridian School District, Mr. Frogley had worked as a teacher for 
approximately seven years with five of those years being at the Boise School District. Then, from 
2004 through part of 2006, he was employed by the Nampa School District as principal for 
Centennial Elementary School. He then worked as the Building Administrator for West Middle 
School in Nampa, Idaho from 2006 until he commenced working for MVHS. (Aff. Frogley ~3 at R. 
p. 307). 
Mr. Frogley had an excellent reputation as an administrator at the time he transferred to the 
Meridian School District. His reputation is evidenced by the letters ofrecommendation he received 
which touted him as having excellent rapport with teachers, parents, and students. (Aff. Frogley, R. 
p. 307). During Mr. Frogley's tenure as a school administrator for the Nampa School District, he 
was not disciplined nor did he receive any write-ups for misconduct or for deficiencies in his job 
perfonnance. Id 
Within two weeks after starting work at MVHS, the lengthy and continuous barrage of 
sexually-related, offensive conduct by his employer started. (Aff. Frogley if6, R. p. 308). On his 
second week of work, Mr. Frogley was attending an administrator's meeting at MVHS with principal 
Maybon and the other three vice principals. During the meeting, an envelope was slid underneath 
the door and Mr. Maybon picked it up and notified Mr. Frogley that he had received some district 
mail. The envelope contained a fake wedding announcement which announced that Mr. Frogley was 
about to marry a "Cheap Two-Bit Tramp." Part of the fake announcement was a picture of a groom 
and a scantily dressed bride in which a picture of his face was imposed on the picture of the groom. 
(Aff. Frogley if6, R. p. 308). Principal Maybon admitted that he had his secretary, Janet Brooks, 
prepare the invitation and then deliver it during the meeting. (Aff. Frogley if6, R. p. 308). 
During the first week oflunch meetings, Principal Aaron Maybon stated that Mr. Frogley was 
having sex with lunch servers in exchange for food. The other administrators laughed at the 
demeaning and improper comment. After that time, the allegations of Mr. Frogley exchanging sexual 
favors for food were directed at him by Mr. Maybon and the other administrators on a nearly daily 
basis. Mr. Frogley objected to the sexual comments, but his objections were to no avail and resulted 
only in an escalation of demeaning taunts, all of a sexual nature. (Aff. Frogley ifl 0, R. p. 310). 
The sexually charged statements directed at Mr. Frogley were pervasive. In addition to the 
near daily claims that Mr. Frogley was having sex with cafeteria staff in exchange for food, Mr. 
Maybon and the other administrators would routinely make other sexual comments directed at Mr. 
Frogley including the following: 
(a) Comments were made about how many women Mr. Frogley was dating and how often 
he was having sex and how many different women he had sex with; (b) how many women he was 
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having sex with at the same time; ( c) whether his sexual preference was for women or men; that he 
was leaving the school ground during lunch to have sex (referred to by Mr. Maybon as "afternoon 
delight"); and ( d) that he had a nest of whores that stood outside his office. In addition to comments 
made directly to him, the administrators would make sexually explicit comments about Mr. Frogley 
even when he was not present.(Aff. Frogley ~11, R. p. 311 ). 
On or about October 23, 2008, Mr. Frogley left campus to have lunch with a female principal 
who was visiting from another school district. Upon his return, Mr. Maybon alleged that Mr. Frogley 
was having sex with the visiting principal, referring to Mr. Frogley as getting some "afternoon 
delight." At other times when Mr. Frogley would leave the school campus for lunch, upon his 
return, Principal Maybon would state, in front of Mr. Frogley and other administrators, that Mr. 
Frogley was leaving to have sex during the lunch hour. (Aff. Frogley ~12, R. p. 311 ). 
In October of2008, during a meeting in which Mr. Frogley and the other administrators were 
present, Mr. Maybon stated that people were noticing that some female teachers were spending fill 
inordinate amount of time around Mr. Frogley's office and then referred to the women as Mr. 
Frogley's "nest of whores." (Aff. Frogley ~13, R. p. 312). 
At the end of October of2008, during fill administrator's lunch, Mr. Frogley was asked by 
fill administrator as to why he would not be able to supervise a football game. When Mr. Frogley 
stated that he couldn't supervise the Halloween day gfillle because he was taking his daughter trick-
or-treating, some of the administrators present challenged the comment stating that Mr. Frogley was 
probably just going on a date. (Aff. Frogley ~14, R. p. 312). One of the administrators commented 
that he may be going out with more than one woman at the Sfillle time. Then Mr. Maybon suggested 
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that Mr. Frogley was homosexual, stating, "Maybe it's not women he's interested in." As with the 
other incidents, Mr. Frogley denied the allegations and stated that they were inappropriate. (Aff. 
Frogley i114, R. p. 3102). 
Melynda Mortenson, the dean of school security, informed Mr. Frogley that the school 
administrators were continually making sexually-related comments about Mr. Frogley even when 
he was not present. (Aff. Frogley ill 5, R. p. 312). 
The sexually-related comments and innuendos embarrassed Mr. Frogley. He would routinely 
respond that the statements were unwanted and inappropriate. Despite his repeated protests, Principal 
Maybon and the other administrators continued harassing Mr. Frogley by subjecting him to the 
sexually-laced statements. This continued during the entire time he was employed by the Meridian 
School District. (Aff. Frogley i116, R. p. 313). 
On November 5, 2008, Mr. Frogley met with Principal Maybon and made a more emphatic 
demand that the sexually-laced comments end. Mr. Maybon became very upset at the demand and 
Mr. Frogley called Dr. Linda Clark and relayed to her what had happened and the need for the 
sexually-related comments to stop and told her that he needed to meet with her to discuss the 
situation.(Aff. Frogley ill 8, 19; R. p. 313-14). 
On November 11, 2008, Mr. Frogley met with Dr. Linda Clark at the district office as a 
follow up to his November 5th phone call discussed above. Again, Mr. Frogley discussed the sexual 
harassment that was taking place and even provided Dr. Clark with a document which outlined some 
of the inappropriate, sexually-related comments that Mr. Maybon and the other administrators had 
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made to him. Dr. Clark told him that he needed to work things out with Mr. Maybon. (Aff. Frogley 
~21, R. p. 315). 
After the early morning meeting, Mr. Frogley returned to MVHS and attended a Special 
Education Symposium. While he was supposed to be one of three speakers, the hosts did not call 
on him to speak like the other two administrators who gave short talks.(Aff. Frogley ~21, R. p. 315). 
On November 12, 2008, Mr. Maybon, for the first time, notified Mr. Frogley that he thought 
his work was deficient. (Aff. Frogley, ~22, R. p. 315) Specifically, Mr. Maybon alleged that Mr. 
Frogley had missed 504 and IEP meetings meetings and was not completing his required teacher 
evaluations in a timely mam1er. ( R. p. 73) He specifically reprimanded Mr. Frogley for failing to 
attend the Special Education Symposium. (Aff. Frogley ~22, R. p. 315). On November 13, 2008, 
at MVHS, Mr. Maybon met with Mr. Frogley and infonned him that he was being reprimanded again 
and placed on a Level II Improvement Plan. At this meeting, Mr. Frogley reiterated that Dr. Linda 
Clark had directed the two to work things out. Mr. Maybon then told Mr. Frogley that he had no 
friends or support in the district and that he should just resign and that if he challenged the 
disciplinary action that a team oflawyers would make his life hell. Principal Maybon further stated 
that after Mr. Frogley had left Dr. Linda Clark's office on November 11, 2008, she called Mr. 
Maybon and directed him to initiate disciplinary action. (Aff. Frogley ~24, R. p 316). 
From November 12, 2008 through Mr. Frogley's last day working at MVHS, Mr. Maybon 
continued to berate Mr. Frogley and make false assertions that he was not perfom1ing his job duties 
and then filed reprimands or improvement plans. (Aff. Frogley ~26-29; R.p. 316-320). 
As a result of the continual sexual harassment and retaliatory treatment Mr. Frogley suffered 
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for having complained about the illegal conduct, he began suffering from severe anxiety and stress. 
He had difficultly sleeping and had a loss of appetite due to the stresses and anxiety he suffered from 
the improper treatment. He sought medical attention from his primary physician, Dr. Raymond 
Hoo ft and was treated for depression and anxiety. Dr. Hoo ft then refeITed him for counseling. Based 
upon Dr. Hooft's referral, Mr. Frogley obtained counseling from Paula Brown, LCPC, LMFT, CPC 
of Alare' Counseling and Coaching PLLC. As a result of the physical ailments he suffered as a 
result of the stress from the harassment and retaliation, the school district placed Mr. Frogley on 
disability. (Aff. Frogley if3 l, R.p. 321). 
By the time Mr. Frogley completed disability, Dr. Clark recommended to the School Board 
to not renew Mr. Frogley' s administrative contract. The recommendation included the false 
accusations concerning Mr. Frogley' s work perfom1ance. The School Board adopted the 
recommendations and chose not to rehire Mr. Frogley. 
Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Frogley filed his Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on May 3, 2010. ®. p. 6). A 
First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial was filed on October 26, 2010. ®. p. 17). 
On November 15, 2010 Mr. Frogley filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Defendant Idaho State 
of Board of Education (R. P. 2). The remaining Defendants, including the Meridian Joint School 
District No. 2, Linda Clark and Aaron Maybon filed Defendants' Answer to First Amended 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on November 4, 2010. 
The Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on December 19, 2011. Mr. Frogley 
filed his responsive briefing with supporting affidavit. In addition to filing a reply brief, Defendants 
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filed a Motion to Strike Excerpts from Affidavit of Wade Frogley in Opposition to Defendants Motion 
for Summary Judgement. 
Oral argument was heard on the Defendants' Motion to Strike and Motion for Summary 
Judgment on February 17, 2012 before the Honorable District Judge Ronald Wilper. District Judge 
Wilper issued his Memorandum Decision and Order Granting and Denying in Part Motion to Strike 
and Granting Motion for Summary Judgment. Judgment was entered on March 29, 2012. Mr. 
Frogley timely filed his appeal on May 9, 2011. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court Commit Error in Granting Summary Judgment on Mr. Frogley's 
Retaliation Claim When a Material Issue of Fact Existed as to Whether or Not the 
Employer's Stated Reasons for Discipline Were Pretextual? 
2. Did the District Court Commit Error in Granting Summary Judgment on Mr. Frogley' s 
Claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A motion for summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56; 
Olson v. Freeman, 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990). Upon a motion for summary judgment, 
all controverted facts are liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. Tusch Enters. v. 
Coffin. 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987). The non-moving party is entitled to the benefit of every 
reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidentiary facts or which can be made from the 
record.Anderson v. Ethington. 103 Idaho 658, 651P.2d923 (1982). The burden at all times is upon 
the moving party to prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Petricevich v. Salmon 
River Canal Company, 92 Idaho 865, 452 P .2d 362 (1969)."The burden of the plaintiff when faced 
with a motion for summary judgment, is not to persuade the judge that an issue will be decided in 
his favor at trial. Rather, he simply must present sufficient materials to show that there is a triable 
issue." Earl v. Crvovac. a Div. of WR. Grace, 115 Idaho 1087, 1093, 772 P.2d 725, 731 
(Ct.App.1989). "A triable issue exists whenever reasonable minds could disagree as to the material 
facts or the inferences to be drawn from those facts." Earl v. Crvovac. a Div. of WR. Grace, 115 
Idaho 1087, 772 P.2d 725 (Ct. App. 1989). 
All doubts are to be resolved against the moving party, and the motion must be denied ifthe 
evidence is such that conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom, and if reasonable people might 
reach different conclusions. G & M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 516-17, 808 P .2d 851, 
853-54 (1991). 
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In an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court's standard of review is 
the same as the district court's standard in ruling on the motion. Karr v. Bermeosolo, 142 Idaho 444, 
447-48, 129 P.3d 88, 91-92 (2005). This Court reviews the record before the district court to 
determine de novo whether there exists any genuine issues of material fact and whether the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. If the evidence shows no disputed issues of 
material fact, what remains is a question oflaw over which the appellate court exercises free review. 
Id. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUlVlMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S 
RETALIATION CLAIM SINCE PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF 
A MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER THE REASONS ADVANCED 
BY THE EMPLOYER FOR ITS ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION WAS 
PRETEXT 
A cornerstone of any summary judgment analysis is the requirement that "all doubts are to 
be resolved against the moving party; that all controverted facts are liberally construed in favor of 
the non-moving party; and, that the motion must be denied if the evidence is such that conflicting 
inferences may be drawn therefrom or if reasonable people might reach different conclusions. G.M 
Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 199 Idaho 514, 516-17, 808 P.2d 851, 853-54 (1991). The District Court 
violated this maxim in finding that no material fact existed as to the question of whether or not the 
reasons advanced by the school district for its adverse actions were pretext. As a result, the Trial 
Court's decision should be reversed. 
The District Court properly outlined the law regarding a retaliation claim under Title VII 
which is as follows: 
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[A] plaintiff must show (1) involvement in a protected activity, (2) an adverse 
employment action, and (3) a causal link between the two. Thereafter, the burden of 
production shifts to the employer to present legitimate reasons for the adverse 
employment action. Once the employer carries this burden, plaintiff must 
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the reason advanced by the 
employer was a pretext. Only then does the case proceed beyond summary judgment 
stage. 
P. 22 of Memorandum Decision and Order, R. p 429, citing, Brooks v. City o(San Mateo, 229 F.3d 
917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000). The District Court then correctly determined that Mr. Frogley had 
demonstrated a prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating that he held a good faith, reasonable 
belief that the underlying challenged actions of his employer violated the law ( R.p 430); that an 
adverse employment action had occurred ( R.p. 430); and, that Mr. Frogley had demonstrated a 
causal link between the adverse actions and his complaint about the harassment. ( R.p. 431 ). 
The Court then concluded that the Defendants met their burden of presenting legitimate 
reasons for the adverse employment action which shifted the burden back to Mr. Frogley to establish 
that a material issue of fact existed as to whether or not the reasons proffered by his employer were 
pretextual. (R.p. 431) A plaintiff can prove pretext in two ways: (1) indirectly, by showing that the 
employer's proffered explanation is "unworthy of credence" because it is internally inconsistent or 
otherwise not believable, or (2) directly, by showing that unlawful discrimination more likely 
motivated the employer. Chuang v. Univ. of California Davis. Bd O(Trustees, 225 F .3d 1115, 1126 
(9th Cir. 2000). The two approaches are not exclusive. Moreover, the plaintiff does not have to 
introduce "additional, independent evidence of discrimination" at the pretext stage. Id at 128. 
In Chuang, the 9th Circuit Court held that the university dean's laughing at a racist remark 
was adequate, direct evidence of discriminatory intent sufficient for the plaintiff to survive summary 
judgment. In discussing the relevance of the evidence, the court noted that an employer's "reaction" 
10 
to a plaintiffs legitimate civil rights activities might be relevant to the showing of pretext. Id. at 
1128. The same evidence may be used at various stages of the court's analysis. At the summary 
judgment stage any form of discriminatory treatment that is otherwise admissible may be used to 
support any allegation of discrimination whether or not there is a direct relationship between the 
various claims involved. Id. at 1128. 
In the case at bar, direct evidence of the defendant's actual motivation of the employer was 
exposed by Dr. Clark and Mr. Maybon's responses to Mr. Frogley's complaints of improper 
treatment. Immediately after Mr. Frogley met Dr. Clark at her office on November 11, 2008 to 
discuss his claims of sexual harassment, Dr. Clark called Mr. Maybon and directed him to start 
disciplinary action. (Aff. Frogley, ~24 at R. p. 316). Mr. Maybon told Mr. Frogley that he had not 
gotten out of the parking lot before Dr. Clark called Mr. Maybon and directed him to initiate 
disciplinary action. (Aff. Frogley, ~24 at R. p. 316). Mr. Maybon added to the aggressive, 
retaliatory stance by telling Mr. Frogley that he had no friends in the district and that Mr. Frogley 
should just resign and that ifhe challenged the disciplinary action that a tern of layers would make 
his life hell. (Id.) 
A reasonable inference of the aggressive, confrontational behavior is that Dr. Clark and Mr. 
Maybon intended to punish Mr. Frogley for his complaining about the sexually based harassment 
he had been subjected. This direct evidence of motive is similar to the direct evidence of the 
discriminatory motive the court gleaned from the Dean's laughing at a racially based joke in Chuang. 
The court in Chuang deemed that the laugh created an inference of racial motivation which the court 
found to be sufficient direct evidence of pretext to overcome summary judgment. Chuang, 225 F .3d 
at 1128. The same result should occur here. 
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In Chuang, the court rejected the trial court's holding that direct evidence of pretext had to 
be specific and substantial. Id. Instead, the 9th Circuit court held that with direct evidence, a triable 
issue as to the actual motivation of the employer is created even if the evidence is not substantial. 
Id The court specifically noted that the "Plaintiff is required to produce 'very little' direct evidence 
of the employer's discriminatory intent to move past summary judgment. Id See also, Godwin v. 
Hunt Wesson. Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998); Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1438 
(91h Cir. 1991). 
The inference extracted from both Dr. Clark and Mr. Maybon's reactions is that the two 
administrators intended on punishing Mr. Frogley for his complaints of the misconduct and that the 
reasons advanced by the district for its adverse employment action were pretextual. Accordingly, 
the District Court's granting of summary judgment as to the claim of retaliation was erroneous and 
should be reversed. 
Further establishing the existence of a material issue of fact is Mr. Frogley' s testimony which 
proves the falsity of the claims the school district alleged as a basis for their disciplinary actions. 
The reasoning provided by the school district to justify its adverse action against Mr. Frogley was 
set forth in a letter Dr. Clark forwarded to the Board of Trustees of the School District in 
recommending that they not re-hire Mr. Frogley. The letter asserted that (1) Mr. Frogley "did not 
appropriately schedule and adhere to an observation schedule and meet the requirements of 
supervision and evaluation of teaching staff to which he was assigned;" (2) that Mr. Frogley did not 
engage in student supervision at the level expected; (3) that "[t]here have also been instances where 
Mr. Frogley's interaction with students has been problematic including at least two allegations of 
harassment from students"; and, ( 4) that Mr. Frogley "has not regularly met his requirements for 
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attending all IEP and Section 504 meetings under his responsibility." 
Mr. Frogley' s testimony establishes that the claims against him were false and that they were 
being used as pretext for the true, retaliatory purpose behind the school district's adverse action. 
Accordingly the trial court's granting of summary judgment was improper. 
A. Mr. Frogley Clearly Established That the School District's Claims That He 
Failed to Observe Teachers Was Inaccurate. 
The claim that Mr. Frogley failed to timely complete his teaching observation duties was first 
made on November 12, 2008 after Mr. Frogley complained to Mr. Maybon. As an administrator, 
Mr. Frogley was required to observe teachers in the classroom and prepare evaluations. The school 
policy specifically requires administrators to conduct both an informal and formal visit followed by 
the completion of a written review. (Aff. Frogley ~ 26, R.p. 317) However, contrary to the 
allegations of not being timely, the district policy only required that the observations and written 
reviews be completed by the end of the school year. (Aff. Frogley~ 26, R. p. 335). As required, Mr. 
Frogley completed all his evaluations by the end of the school year and, thus, he complied with the 
district policy. ( Aff. Frogley ~' R. p. 317-318) 
Moreover, Mr. Maybon knew the allegations were false when he made them and that Mr. 
Frogley had actually completed more observations than any other administrator, including Mr. 
Maybon, even though he had a valid excuse not to even have performed a single evaluation. 
Mr. Frogley was selected to be part of a new pilot program in which the observers were to be given 
handheld devices with special software which the observers could use to complete reviews while 
observing a teacher within the classroom by entering information electronically into the system. Dr. 
Linda Clark specifically requested Mr. Frogley hold off performing his evaluations until he could 
complete the training and use the new device. (Aff. Frogley ~ 26, R.p. 317) By the first part of 
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November 2008, however, Mr. Frogley had not yet received training on the device. Id. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Frogley took initiative and commenced his informal classroom observations of 
his assigned teachers. Despite the hindrance created by Mr. Frogley being placed in a pilot program 
and not receiving training, by the first of November 2008 Mr. Frogley had completed the most 
teacher observations of any administrator. This fact came to light during a meeting of the 
administrators in early November 2008 wherein Mr. Maybon questioned the administrators on their 
progress in completing evaluations. (R.p. 317) Mr. Maybon and another administrator, Heath 
Mcinlery, admitted they had not completed a single observation. 
A reasonable inference for the false accusation is that the school district was manufacturing 
excuses to justify reprimanding Mr. Frogley for his complaining of illegal sexual harassment. 
B. The School District's Allegations of Mr. Frogley Failing to Attend Meetings Was 
Misleading. 
While it is true that Mr. Frogley did miss some IEP and Section 504 meetings, all the other 
administrators had also missed such meetings and, yet, Mr. Frogley was the only administrator who 
was disciplined for the missed meetings. (Aff. Frogley-i! 27, R.p. 317-18) Clearly, a reasonable 
inference for the school district's singling out of Mr. Frogley is that the district's cited rationale for 
punishment was only a pretext. 
Further exposing the pretextual nature of the grounds for punishment is the fact that Mr. 
Frogley's failure to attend such meetings was beyond his control as he was not responsible for 
scheduling his meetings and the person who did so would schedule Mr. Frogley to be in more than 
one meeting at the same time. (Aff. Frogley -ii 27, R.p. 318) Obviously, Mr. Frogley cannot be in 
more than one place at a time. Thus, the school's disciplining of Mr. Frogley for something he has 
no control over and which was precipitated by the poor scheduling system created by the school 
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district would be grossly improper. It is inconceivable that the school district would discipline Mr. 
Frogley for something he had no control. Accordingly, a reasonable inference from the district's 
claimed basis for disciplinary action is that it was a pretext to the true reason for the discipline which 
was to punish Mr. Frogley for complaining of sexual harassment. 
The reasonable inferences from the school district's singling out and disciplining Mr. Frogley 
for missing meetings when all the other administrators had done the same thing was that it was 
pretextual. Likewise, the failure of the district to mention the problem until after Mr. Frogley lodged 
his complaint also suggests that it was not the true reason for the disciplinary action. Accordingly, 
Mr. Frogley has established a material issue of fact for which the granting of summary judgment was 
improper. 
C. Mr. Frogley Established That the Alleged Harassment of Students Was Pretext. 
A key basis for the District Court's finding that Mr. Frogley had failed to establish his burden 
of proof to avoid summary judgment was the allegation that he had harassed students. The District 
Court stated that "the evidence of student harassment is enough individually to support the adverse 
employment action ... " (P. 25 of Memorandum at R.p. 432) The Court's statement reveals that it had 
not properly considered Mr. Frogley' s testimony and thus did not properly analyze the evidence with 
proper rules of construction applicable to summary judgment motions. 
Mr. Frogley denied harassing any students and established that he had never been notified 
of or questioned by the district about the student's allegations. (Aff. Frogley if 29, R.p. 319-320) 
Moreover, Mr. Frogley proved that the complaints lacked merit. As such, Mr. Frogley created a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether the his employer's use of the student complaints as a reason for 
disciplinary action was pretext. 
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The students complaints of harassment consisted of statements made by Courtney Drasher 
and Ms. Compton. Remarkably, in both cases, the girls happened to lodge their complaints months 
after the alleged misconduct and, coincidently, they lodged their complaints within a few weeks of 
each other. Courtney Drasher made her complaint on November 24, 200 8 ( R. p. 14 3) while Mikay la 
Compton's complaint was received on December 12, 2008. ( R. p. 99) 
Despite the existence of the two student complaints, Mr. Frogley was never contacted nor 
questioned about the allegations set forth in the complaints. This alone renders the existence of the 
complaints as being the basis of Mr. Frogley's disciplinary action as highly suspect. 
Mr. Frogley contact with Ms. Drashner was a result of suspicious activity. Mr. Frogley had 
been notified that there was an increased concern of students having drugs on campus so that 
administrators were to be on heightened alert during class breaks. ( R. p. 320.) On one occasion, 
Mr. Frogley observed a group of students, which included Ms. Drashner, and saw one student 
passing something to Ms. Drashner. Troubling was the fact that the students became very nervous 
when they realized they were being watched and acted as if they were hiding something. Id. When 
Mr. Frogley made contact, Ms. Drashner challenged his authority; certainly an act that belies the 
timid and easily frightened person she portrays herself to be in her complaint. Mr. Frogley explained 
his position at the school and confirmed he indeed had authority to make his inquiry. Nothing 
further happened. ( R.p 320) 
Ms. Compton complained that Mr. Frogley confronted her and her boyfriend at the 
homecoming dance due to their inappropriate dancing. Ms. Compton then complained of being told 
to stop kissing her boyfriend while at school despite the fact that personal displays of affection 
(PDA's) were against school rules. In both situations, the complaints were based upon the 
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enforcement of school rules. Id 
Strangely, Ms. Compton mentions that Mr. Frogley looked at her v-neck shirt and made her 
uncomfortable. She clarified her concern by stating that his looking at the shirt "was not in a way 
that I felt he was violating me, but in a way that he disapproved of my shirt." ( R. p. 98. A possible 
explanation for any display of disapproval of her shirt could simply be the fact that Mr. Frogley's 
job required him to enforce the dress code. ( R.p 320) Regardless, the complaint is petty and fails 
to set forth any improper conduct. This fact would explain why the school district never questioned 
Mr. Frogley about the complaints. 
Giving Mr. Frogley all benefits of reasonable inferences, the petty nature of Ms. Compton's 
complaint, the suspect nature of the timing of the complaints and the fact that the school failed to 
notify or question Mr. Frogley about the complaints all suggests that the school never considered the 
complaints sufficient to warrant disciplinary action. As such, there exists a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether or not the girl's complaints were the true reason for the school's adverse action 
against Mr. Frogley. 
Liberally construing all controverted facts in favor of Mr. Frogley and giving him the 
benefit of all reasonable inferences, it is clear that a genuine issue of material fact exists such that 
the Court's granting of summary judgement on the Plaintiffs retaliation claim was done in error 
and should be reversed. 
II. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on Mr. Frogley's 
Claim of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress since There Exited Genuine 
Issues of Material Fact. 
A genuine issue of material fact existed concerning the validity of Mr. Frogley's claim of 
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim and, thus, summary judgment was improper. 
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To successfully prosecute a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, Mr. Frogley was 
required to prove the following elements; (1) a duty recognized by law requiring the defendant to 
conform to a certain standard of construction; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection 
between the conduct and the plaintiff's injury; and (4) actual loss or damage. In addition, there 
must be some physical manifestation of the plaintiffs' emotional injury. Johnson v. McPhee, 147 
Idaho 455, 466, 210 P.3d 563, 574 (Ct. App. 2009). In the case at bar, Mr. Frogley satisfied all 
of the prescribed elements. Nevertheless, the district court granted summary judgment bn the 
ground that the risk of harm was not foreseeable. In reaching this conclusion, the district court 
relied upon the holding in Johnson. Id. Such reliance was misplaced. Contrary to the District 
Court's analysis, the court in Johnson detennined that the negligent infliction of emotional 
distress claim was viable; stating, "if all reasonable inferences are drawn in [Johnson's] favor, 
Johnson provide sufficient evidence from which a tier of fact could find that his burden of proof 
is satisfied on all of the elements of his negligent infliction of emotional distress." Johnson, 14 7 
Idal10 at 469, 210 P.3d at 577. The Court in Johnson, granted summary judgment only because 
the trial was bench trial such that the court was not obligated to draw reasonable inferences in 
Johnson's favor. 
Contrary to the facts in Johnson v. McPhee, the case at bar involves a jury and, thus, the 
trial court was obligated to give Mr. Frogley the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Every 
person has a duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent umeasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to 
others. Johnson, 147 Idaho at 467, 210 P.3d at 575. An employer, however owes his or her 
employees a greater degree of respect because other employment relationship. Steiner v. 
Showboat Operating Co .. 25 F.3d 1459, 1466 (9th Cir. 1994). Liberally construing all 
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controverted facts in Mr. Frogley's favor and giving him the benefit of every reasonable 
inference, it is clear that he has presented sufficient proof for a viable negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claim. Without question, the defendants constant humiliation of Mr. Frogley; 
their continual personal attacks upon Mr. Frogley's professional abilities; and imposition of 
disciplinary actions can foreseeably create sufficient stress and anxiety to cause physical harm. 
In the case at bar, Mr. Frogley suffered stress and anxiety which manifested itself in loss of sleep 
and appetite. (Aff. Frogley if 31, R.p. 321). As a result of the stress and anxiety, Mr. Frogley 
sought medical care and was treated for depression and anxiety and obtained counseling. As a 
result of the physical ailments he suffered, the school district placed Mr. Frogley on disability. 
(Aff. Frogley if 31, R.p. 321). 
Given the above, there is no doubt that Mr. Frogley provided sufficient proof to satisfy 
every element of a claim. Accordingly, the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment as to the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Appellant respectfully requests this Court reverse the 
District Court's granting of summary judgment. 
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP 
By: . <:;,~ hh& ~ =~emberoffuefirm 
ys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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